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COORDINATED BARGAINING TACTICS
OF UNIONS*
Stephen B. Goldbergt
In October 1968 the National Labor Relations Board issued its
long-awaited decision in General Electric Co.,1 the coordinated bar-
gaining case. GE is a major step in the evolution of national labor
policy towards coordinated bargaining tactics, but it leaves important
issues unresolved.
I
THE General Electric CASE
Briefly, the facts in GE were these: In 1965 eight international
unions representing GE employees in separate bargaining units joined
together to form the Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB).
The stated purpose of the CCB was to formulate a set of common
goals and to achieve those goals through "coordinated" bargaining
with GE. It was understood by the participating unions that when the
common goals were determined, no union would deviate from those
goals without first consulting the other unions.
Beginning in November 1965, the CCB sought a meeting with
GE to discuss the common demands of the cooperating unions, but
GE refused to participate in multi-union discussions. The unions
then retreated. One of them, the International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), announced that it was abandon-
ing its request for joint bargaining and sought a meeting solely be-
tween GE and the IUE negotiating committee. GE agreed to this
suggestion, and the two parties arranged a meeting.
In preparation for that meeting, however, IUE added to its nego-
tiating committee as nonvoting members one representative from each
This article is an expanded and slightly altered version of a paper delivered at the
21st Annual Winter Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association in Chicago,
Illinois, on December 30, 1968. Excerpts from that paper have appeared in the April, 1969,
issue of the MONTHLY LABOR REaviw and the Proceedings of the 21st Annual Winter
Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association.
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1959,
Harvard University.
1 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305 (Oct. 23, 1968), enforced in relevant part,
General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 71 L.R.R.M. 2418 (2d Cir. June 9, 1969).
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of the other seven unions that had comprised, with IUE, the CCB.
IUE's stated purpose in adding these representatives was to gain the
benefit of their experience in negotiating with GE. IUE also claimed
that this device would provide inter-union communication adequate
to prevent GE's signing a contract with one union on terms favorable
to the company and then using that contract as a lever to obtain favor-
able contract terms from other unions. The company was thought to
have practiced such "whipsawing" in the past.
GE refused to meet with IUE as long as representatives of other
unions were present. IUE then filed unfair labor practice charges pro-
testing the company's failure to meet. The Board, with Member Jen-
kins dissenting, sustained the union's contention that GE, by its refusal
to bargain with IUE, had violated section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act.2
The critical issue, as the Board saw it, was quite narrow. Although
GE claimed that the outside union representatives, though formally
representing IUE, in fact intended to bargain for their own unions,
the Board found this claim unsupported by the evidence before it.
Indeed, the Board stated that by its refusal to negotiate at all with the
IUE committee, GE had prevented any demonstration of intent by
the outside union representatives. Thus it was unnecessary for the
Board to decide whether attempted bargaining by members of the
IUE negotiating committee on behalf of unions other than IUE, i.e.,
multi-unit or joint bargaining, would have privileged the company's
refusal to negotiate. Similarly, the Board found a lack of evidence to
support the company's contention that the several unions were "locked
in" to an understanding that none would sign a contract until all had
satisfactory offers. Thus it was also unnecessary for the Board to decide
whether proof of such an agreement would have justified a refusal to
bargain. Finally, since no charges against IUE were before it,3 the
Board had no occasion to consider whether, apart from the effect of
IUE's conduct on GE's bargaining obligation, that conduct was itself
unlawful. On the Board's view of the facts, therefore, the sole issue of
law before it was whether the mere presence on the IUE negotiating
committee of persons normally representing unions other than IUE
justified the company's refusal to bargain. The Board had little trouble
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
3 Charges had been filed, but were dismissed by the Board's General Counsel. See
McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
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resolving that issue against GE, and the courts, in cases preceding GE,
have accepted this principle.4
The starting point for analysis of the Board's decision in GE is
section 7 of the Labor Act.5 Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall
have the right to ... bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing," and this right has repeatedly been held to include
the derivative right of the bargaining agent to select the individuals
who will act in its behalf.6 In a few cases the Board has held that an
individual was subject to a conflict of interest so severe as to disqualify
him from serving as a representative,7 but the principle of those cases
does not seem controlling here.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate that possible conflicts of
interest among the representatives should not have privileged GE's
refusal to bargain is to analyze the contrary arguments in the dissenting
opinion of Board Member Jenkins. Member Jenkins argued that a
representative of, for example, IAM, temporarily serving on the IUE
negotiating committee, would find it impossible to separate the inter-
ests of IAM from those of IUE. Accordingly, the representative would
argue against accepting a company proposal that would be to the ad-
vantage of IUE if its acceptance would put pressure on JAM to accept
a similar or less satisfactory proposal not in the best interests of IAM.
The consequences would be harmful not only to IUE-represented em-
ployees, who might lose benefits otherwise available to them, but to
4 See Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1963); McLeod v. General
Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 701-02 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d
Cir. 1966). See also American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 632
(6th Cir. 1967); Wagner, Multi-Union Bargaining: A Legal Analysis, 19 LAB. LJ. 731, 738-39
(1968).
The Board also rejected (3-2) GE's defense that no violation of the Act could be found
in its refusal to meet with IUE prior to the date on which the existing contract, by its
terms, was subject to reopening. The Board found that, although GE was under no obliga-
tion to reopen the contract ahead of time, it had agreed to do so, and held that when
parties agree on early reopening they are subject to the same standards of good faith bar-
gaining as if the contract expressly provided for such opening. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, at 9,
69 L.R.R.M. at 1309. Discussion of this issue is outside the scope of this article.
5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
6 See cases cited in note 4 supra. See also NLRB v. Roscoe Skipper, Inc., 213 F.2d 793,
794 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir.
1960). Compare these cases with NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Wkrs. Union,
274 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Kentucky Util. Co., 182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950).
7 See Kennecott Copper Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 75 (1952); Douglas Aircraft Co., 53 N.L.R.B.
486, 489 (1943); cf. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954). But cf. NLRB
v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505 (Ist Cir. 1968).
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the employer, which would find it "virtually impossible. . to achieve
its aims and possibly amicably settle one phase of its negotiations and
obtain a certain measure of industrial peace ...."s
Member Jenkins's arguments are not persuasive. In the first place,
the non-IUE representatives did not have the power to prevent IUE
from accepting a company offer satisfactory to IUE. Not only were all
non-IUE representatives without a vote on the negotiating committee,
but the negotiating committee itself was limited to recommending to
the IUE Conference Board whether the latter, composed solely of IUE
representatives, should accept or reject an offer by GE. The ultimate
decision was made by the Conference Board.9 Thus the danger of any
injury to the interests of IUE employees through the presence on the
negotiating committee of representatives from other unions, whose
interests might differ from those of IUE, does not appear substantial.
Of course, the presence at the bargaining table of representatives
of other unions might discourage IUE from engaging in negotiations
leading to a settlement on terms advantageous to it but not to the other
unions. Nonetheless, it was the judgment of all the unions, including
IUE, that the pursuit of individual, short-term advantage by one
union on behalf of employees represented by it would, in the long run,
be harmful to the long-term common interests of all GE unions and
employees. It would hardly be appropriate for the Board to substitute
its judgment for that of the employees' chosen representative as to
whether the long-term economic interests of those employees might
most satisfactorily be advanced by separate or coordinated bargaining.
Primary responsibility for advancing employee economic interests
vis-h-vis the employer unquestionably rests with the union, not with
the Labor Board.'0
The presence of representatives of other unions, by discouraging
an individual settlement on terms favorable to IUE but not to the
other unions, might also encourage economic confrontation, and such
confrontation might be substantially broader than it would be if each
union bargained individually. Indeed, it would seem clear that it was
primarily to present GE with the spectre of several strikes at the same
time that the several unions dealing with GE decided to utilize a sys-
tem of coordinated bargaining.". The resulting threat to industrial
8 173 N.L.RB. No. 46, at 19, 69 L.R.R.M. at 1312 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
9 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 693 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
10 Cf. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1968).
11 This is not to say that the unions had necessarily agreed that none would sign until
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peace, however, would not have justified the Board in proscribing the
presence of the non-IUE representatives. Industrial peace is not nor-
mally to be purchased by depriving a party of a valuable bargaining
tactic. The Supreme Court has held that, although the Labor Act com-
pels parties to bargain in good faith, it does not preclude them from
resorting to tactics destructive of industrial peace in order to strengthen
their respective bargaining positions.1 2 In Insurance Agents' Interna-
tional Union,13 the Board found that a union's slow-down tactics, de-
signed to put pressure on the employer during otherwise good faith
bargaining, constituted a violation of the union's statutory bargaining
obligation. The Court thought otherwise:
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual
exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract
logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of
the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the
legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the
mott serious effect upon individual workers and productive enter-
prises, to induce one party to dome to the terms desired by the other.
But the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of
our national labor relations policy, the two factors ... exist side
by side....
... [W]e think the Board's approach involves an intrusion into
the substantive aspects of the bargaining process .... [i]f the Board
could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used
as part of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise
considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the
parties contract. As the parties' own devices became more limited,
the Government might have to enter even more directly into the
negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy is not pres-
ently erected on a foundation of governmenit control 6f the results
of negotiations."4
The freedom of the parties to utilize whatever bargaining tactics
they wish has not always been afforded the solicitude shown by the
Court in Insurance Agents.' 5 Indeed, Professor Wellington has re-
ferred to that case as "perhaps the high water mark for freedom of con-
tract in modem labor-management relations."' 6 If that be so, how-
All did, since the independent action of each union in holding but for the goals that all
had agreed upon could also present the employer with a number of strikes at the same time,
12 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 US. 477 (1960).
13 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
14 361 U.S. at 489-90.
15 See, e.g., NLR.B v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), discussed ill Cox, The
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAgv. L. Rzv. 14011 1430-42 (1958).
i H. Wm.waroN, LABOR AND liE I.dAL Pocas 63 (1968).
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ever, the tide has not ebbed appreciably since Insurance Agents'. In
American Ship Building Co.f 7 the Board found a lockout aimed at
strengthening the employer's bargaining position to be unlawful be-
cause the employer had no reasonable grounds to believe a strike was
imminent. Despite the interruption of industrial peace caused by the
lockout, the Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on the Insurance
Agents' principle that the Board is not an arbiter of what economic
weapons a party may use in seeking acceptance of its contract de-
mands.18 This principle is not without its limitations; if the use of
a particular economic weapon by an employer is inherently destruc-
tive of employee interests in self-organization and collective bargain-
ing, the use of that weapon will violate sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.' 9 But the mere fact that a particular tactic or weapon is inimi-
cal to industrial peace does not provide a basis for proscribing its use.
This is the essential teaching of Insurance Agents', and it has not been
eroded by subsequent decisions. 20
Nor is there any characteristic unique to coordinated bargaining
tactics that removes them from the protection of Insurance Agents'.
Multi-union collaboration against a large employer may lead to a
strike that will shut that employer down, cause unemployment for
many non-striking employees, and seriously inconvenience the public.
On the other hand, uncoordinated bargaining with a common em-
ployer has led to the same or worse results; even the strike of a single
strategically placed union can be disastrous. In neither of these situ-
ations, however, has it been suggested that the union bargaining
tactics are unlawful.
17 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963).
18 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 200, 317-18 (1965). See also NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
19 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); American Ship Bldg.
v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-32 (1963). See generally Christensen & Svanoe,
Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and
the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE LJ. 1269 (1968); Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Im-
pact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 CoxmNu L.Q. 193 (1966); Schatzki,
The Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEXAs L. Rnv. 470
(1966).
20 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), is not inconsistent with this conclusion. The
vice of an employer's unilateral alteration in terms and conditions of employment during
bargaining, found to be unlawful in that case, is not only that it is disruptive of the bar-
gaining process, and so destructive of industrial peace, but also that it is not a tactic used
to, or likely to, improve the terms of the agreement from the employer's standpoint.
Rather, its likely result will be a permanent unilateral determination by the employer of
conditions of employment, a result contrary to the Labor Act's purpose of encouraging
joint determinations. See Schatzki, supra note 19, at 495-501.
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This is not to deny the desirability of discouraging persons with
the power to call company-wide strikes from utilizing that power un-
necessarily; it is simply to say that the impact of an economic weapon
does not determine its legality under the existing national labor re-
lations laws.2 1 A different statutory scheme may be thought desirable
by some, but consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this
paper as it is beyond the province of the Board and the reviewing
courts. 22 The question here, as before those tribunals, is whether co-
ordinated union bargaining tactics violate the Labor Act, and the
point is that the risk of company-wide strikes flowing from the use of
these tactics is not a basis for finding their use unlawful. Nor, on
the same reasoning, does their use justify an employer's refusal to
bargain with the cooperating unions; to hold otherwise would be to
permit the Board to deter indirectly, by depriving the unions of the
benefits of the Act, what it could not prohibit directly. Hence the
Board properly declined to excuse GE from its bargaining obligation
on the ground that the presence of representatives of other unions on
the IUE negotiating committee would be disruptive of industrial peace.
The final point in Member Jenkins's dissent was that to allow
representatives of employees in other units to attend and participate
in negotiations for a unit which they do not represent
may have the effect of broadening or narrowing, at the pleasure of
the unions concerned, the numbers, types and locations of the em-
ployees covered or affected by the bargaining. This in turn would
conflict with the responsibility of the Board to determine the scope
of the appropriate unit under Section 9 of the Act .... 23
Pressing for multi-unit bargaining is of doubtful legality, but the
presence of representatives from other unions does not inevitably lead
to multi-unit bargaining without the employer's consent. Indeed, rep-
resentatives of other unions might be scrupulously careful to avoid
21 One exception, not here relevant, is that a strike (or lockout) affecting an entire
industry or a substantial part thereof, and which imperils the national health or safety,
may be enjoined for 80 days. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)
§§ 206-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
Another exception may relate to the use by one party of a bargaining weapon that
would totally destroy the rough balance of power that exists between unions and employers
by inevitably bringing the other party to its knees. Cf. Schatzki, Some Observations and
Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer---"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEXAs L. Rav.
378, 382 (1969). Multi-union collaboration in bargaining, however, whatever gains it may
accomplish for the participating unions in some cases, surely is insufficient to compel total
submission on the part of all employers.
22 See McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd oa other
grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
23 General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, at 20, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1312 (1968).
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such pressures. Under these circumstances, the majority in GE seems
to have been clearly correct in holding that the mere possibility that
the non-IUE representatives might seek multi-unit bargaining did
not warrant forbidding attendance of such representatives at the IUE
negotiations.
II
AGREEMENTS RESTRICTING THE UNION'S FREEDOM TO CONTRACT
A more difficult set of questions are those the Board found it un-
necessary to decide in GE. The first of these is whether the unions in-
volved might lawfully have entered into an agreement as to the cir-
cumstances under which each would contract with GE.
Two types of agreement are possible that are substantially more
restrictive of an individual union's freedom to contract than the
agreement involved in GE. That agreement was that none of the co-
operating unions would sign for less than the agreed-upon terms with-
out consulting the others. Alternatively, a number of unions bargaining
with a single employer might agree that none will sign a contract for
less than the agreed-upon terms without the consent of the others.
Under this "minimum-terms-or-consent" agreement, each union is
free to sign when the employer offers to grant it the common demands.
A somewhat more restrictive agreement is that no union will sign
until all are offered the agreed-upon terms-a "common-terms-to-all"
agreement. In the past the Board has drawn a distinction between
these agreements. In Standard Oil Co.,24 it held a union's refusal to
sign a contract predicated on a minimum-terms-or-consent agreement
to be lawful, but a refusal predicated on a common-terms-to-all agree-
ment was held to violate section 8(b)(3) of the Act.2 5
A. Minimum-Terms-or-Consent Agreements
With respect to the minimum-terms-or-consent agreement, the
Board appears correct in finding no violation of the Act; such an agree-
24 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963). See also American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1967).
25 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964). In deciding that the union respondents in Standard
Oil had violated the Act by refusing to sign agreements in two units until negotiations
were satisfactorily concluded by another local in another unit, the Board noted that the
unions had failed to raise their demand for agreement at the third unit during negotia-
tions, "but rather, without any consultation with the Company, made such agreement a
sine qua non of their signing the fully negotiated contracts." 137 N.L.R.B. at 691. See also
Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40, 45 (6th Cir. 1963). The Standard Oil holding is
thus quite narrow and is perhaps limited to the facts of the case.
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ment serves a legitimate and substantial union interest. Settlement
by one of several unions negotiating with the same employer on terms
less satisfactory than those demanded by the others places each of the
others at a substantial disadvantage in seeking the employer's agree-
ment to the greater demands. The employer's right to coordinate his
bargaining with several separate bargaining units, establishing a com-
pany-wide pattern from which none of the negotiators in the in-
dividual units is free to vary, further supports the conclusion that a
minimum-terms-or-consent agreement does not violate a union's bar-
gaining obligation. This was precisely the manner in which GE han-
dled its bargaining with the several unions representing its employees.
The employer's obvious purpose is to improve his over-all bargaining
position by preventing a high settlement in one unit from being used
as a lever to obtain such settlements elsewhere. If this is a legitimate
means for an employer to strengthen his bargaining position, it seems
equally legitimate when used by a union.
A minimum-terms-or-consent agreement does not force the em-
ployer to engage in what as a practical matter is joint or multi-unit
bargaining. Although the demands are determined on a multi-unit
basis, the employer remains free to discuss those demands on a unit-by-
unit basis.
The more serious objection to a minimum-terms-or-consent agree-
ment is that it lessens the significance of the bargaining table as a
place where argument, persuasion, and the free interchange of views
can take place; crucial decisions are made not at the bargaining table
but in the inter-union conferences. Regardless of its impact on the
value of bargaining, however, the minimum-terms-or-consent agree-
ment seems to fall within the protection of the Insurance Agents'
case.26 An agreement between a group of unions dealing with the
same employer that none will sign for less than the agreed-upon terms
increases the pressure on the employer to satisfy the common demands
of each; the employer knows that if he does not acquiesce, he may be
faced with a number of simultaneous strikes. It is precisely the teach-
ing of Insurance Agents' that an economic weapon of this nature, much
less an implied threat thereof, is not to be held unlawful simply be-
cause it renders the peaceful persuasion of the bargaining table less
meaningful.
Finally, it might be argued on the basis of the Board's earlier
General Electric decision 27 that a union that is party to a minimum-
terms-or-consent agreement takes a bargaining position "akin to that
26 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
27 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
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of a party who enters into negotiations 'with a predetermined resolve
not to budge from an initial position,' an attitude inconsistent with
good faith bargaining." 2 A union arguably cannot be bargaining in
good faith when it comes to the bargaining table having previously
entered into an agreement not to sign a contract except on terms agreed
to by it and another union. To the extent the Board's General Electric
decision supports that argument,29 however, the decision appears
erroneous. It is plain on the face of the Act that neither a union nor
an employer need compromise its initial bargaining position to satisfy
its obligation to bargain in good faith.30 As long as the union or em-
ployer is not seeking to avoid agreement altogether, insistence on terms
favorable to it, albeit the terms originally proposed by it, does not
violate its bargaining obligation.31 Consequently, there is no justifica-
tion for holding that either must come to the bargaining table prepared
to compromise its initial position. And, applying that logic to the
immediate problem, there is no reason why a union cannot come to
the bargaining table having agreed with another union not to com-
promise, but to insist on the agreed-upon terms. Rather, as Member
Jenkins stated in his concurring opinion in the earlier General Electric
decision:
I would not find a lack of good-faith bargaining where either the
employer or the union entered the negotiations with a fixed posi-
tion from which it proposed not to retreat, engaged in hard bar
gaining to maintain or protect such position, and made no conces-
sions from that position as a result of bargaining.32
Although minimum-terms-or-consent agreements should be held
lawful, they probably should not be subject to judicial enforcement.
If the agreement were enforceable, even a union which had been con-
vinced by the employer that it should compromise its initial position
could be barred from doing so. The imposition of this absolute bar-
28 Id. at 196, quoting from NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149,' 154 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J.).
29 But see 150 N.L.R.B. at 197: "Our decision rests ... upon a consideration of the
totality of Respondent's conduct." Se qiso Jaffe, Major Developments of the Year under
the NLRA, 18TH NYU ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 61, 65-67 (1966).
30 LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). See also H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 34-35 (1947).
31 See Cox, supra note 15, at 1412-18 & cases cited therein.
32 15Q N.L.R.B. at 199. On this analysis, the congressional disapproval of a "take it or
leave it" approach to bargaining (93 CONG. REc. 4135, 4363, 5014 (1947)) is effectuated by
requiring a party to explain the reasons for its bargaining position and listen to arguments
from the other party as to why it should alter that position, not by compelling conces-
sions or a willingness to make concessions, either of which would be inconsistent with
§ 8(d). See Cox, supra note 15, at 1411-12.
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rier to entering into a collective agreement may be contrary to the
national labor policy favoring such agreements. 3 Concluding that a
minimum-terms-or-consent agreement is not judicially enforceable
does not render meaningless the conclusion that such agreements are
not unlawful. As a practical matter, judicial enforcement is rarely if
ever contemplated as a sanction for non-performance of such an agree-
ment;34 the parties trust that the long-term benefits of abiding by the
agreement will overcome the short-term advantages offered by the
employer for not doing so. A conclusion that uiions may lawfully
enter into minimum-terms-or-consent agreements but that such agree-
ments are not judicially enforceable appears to be a reasonable balance
between the competing policies of encouraging parties to enter into
collective agreements and leaving them free to take such steps as they
wish to strengthen their respective bargaining positions.
B. Common-Terms-to-All Agreements
The second type of agreement is the common-terms-to-all agree-
ment. Here the cooperating unions agree that none will sign until all
receive the agreed-upon terms. Against the legality of a refusal to con-
tract based on such an agreement, it is argued that the union's in-
sistence on certain action by the employer elsewhere introduces into
the negotiations an issue unrelated to the terms and conditions of
employment in the unit for which it is supposed to be bargaining.
Agreement on those terms and conditions is thereby frustrated, con-
trary to the purpose of the Act.3 5
The contrary argument is that it is wholly unrealistic to regard
terms and conditions in one unit as irrelevant to the interests of em-
ployees in other units. 6 The employees in each unit have a direct and
immediate interest in the terms and conditions of employment in
every other unit since a low scale of wages and benefits in one unit will
tend to depress these items in all units. If the unions representing
separate units cannot decline to sign contracts until the other unions
33 Although only an injunction ordering compliance with the inter-union agreement
would constitute an absolute barrier to entering into a collective agreement, the prospect
of a substantial damage award for doing so might, as a practical matter, be an equal
deterrent. Thus, if the former is not allowed, neither should the latter be permitted.
34 Research has disclosed no reported cases in which a union sought judicial enforce-
ment of an inter-union agreement prohibiting signing of a contract with an employer
except on certain terms.
35 Cf. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 556 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).
36 See United States Pipe 9- Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690, 693-96 (1962) (Chair-
man McCulloch, dissenting).
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have received satisfactory offers, the employer will be free to sign a
contract with one or more unions at the agreed-upon terms and then,
freed from the threat of supportive strikes by the no-strike clauses in
the contracts already signed, insist on lower terms in the other units37
Finally, by alternating the' units in which favorable contracts are signed,
the employer could prevent any glaring disparities from developing
while at the same time keeping the general wage and benefit level
below what it might otherwise be. On the other hand, if each union
may decline to sign a contract, even on the agreed-upon terms, until all
other unions bargaining with the same employer have also been offered
those terms, each union will be free to exert economic pressure in
support of the other unions to the long-range advantage of all.38
The conclusion that it is not unlawful for a union to refuse to
sign a contract otherwise acceptable to it, in order to remain free to
exert economic pressure on behalf of other unions in other bargaining
units, is buttressed by holdings under the Labor Act. It has long been
held that employees have a section 7 right to strike in support of the
demands of other employees of the same employer, even though the
latter are in a separate bargaining unit39 and that such a strike does
not violate section 8(b)(4), the secondary boycott section of the Act.40
The Board and the courts have recognized that such action assures the
employees in the first unit of the support of the other employees if
the first unit has a dispute with the employer. Section 8(b)(4) is of
particular significance since the competing interests involved there are
37 This tactic could be used to particular advantage by an employer who operates
more than one plant engaged in the same process. Such an employer could, after signing a
contract at one or more plants, substantially minimize the impact of a strike at any other
plant by transferring work from the struck plant to non-struck plants.
38 See Hildebrand, Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of View, 19 LAB.
LJ. 524, 525-27 (1968).
39 See Southern Greyhound Lines, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 1968-1 CCH NLRB 22,177
(Feb. 28, 1968); A.O. Smith Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 n.5 (1961), modified, 343 F.2d 103
(7th Cir. 1965); Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642, 1683 (1952), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954); cf. Houston Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 664 (1967). Although a divided Board held in Brown & Root, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B.
1031, 1036-38 (1952), modified, 203 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1953), that employees in one unit
striking in protest against unfair labor practices involving employees in another unit were
not to be treated as unfair labor practice strikers, but only as economic strikers (see NLRB
v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954)), there was
no dispute as to the protected nature of the strike, despite the non-unit status of the
striking employees. See also A.O. Smith Corp., supra at 340 n.5.
40 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964). See Houston Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
664, 667-69 (1967); cf. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 986, 225 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955). But see Penello v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists, 291 F. Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1968); Kennedy v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper
Guild, F. Supp. , 69 L.R.R.M. 2301 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1968).
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essentially the same as those involved in the problem before us; in
each case labor has an interest in bringing economic pressure to bear
to obtain its legitimate goals, and the employer has a countervailing
interest in narrowing the permissible field of industrial conflict.41 In-
asmuch as the use of economic pressure in support of employees in
another bargaining unit is not a violation of section 8(b)(4), the
union seems justified in not signing a contract containing a no-strike
clause in order to remain free to utilize what the law recognizes as per-
missible economic pressure. Not signing seems justified even if the
contract contains only a limited no-strike clause, one that does not bar
the union from striking in support of the demands of other employees
of the same employer. Presumably the union would not refuse to con-
tract under these circumstances unless its refusal to do so placed some
economic pressure on the employer to accede to the demands of
those other employees. If the union's interest in the outcome of a dis-
pute involving employees in another bargaining unit is sufficient to
justify the use of a strike in support of those employees, it would also
appear sufficient to justify the utilization of whatever economic pres-
sure might flow from the refusal to contract. Hence, no-strike clause
or not, a union should be free to refuse to sign a contract otherwise
acceptable to it in order to put pressure on the employer to acquiesce
in the demands of other employees in a separate bargaining unit.42
The power of employers, under some circumstances, to agree on
a common bargaining position and utilize their combined economic
power to resist a union's demands provides additional support for the
legality of a refusal to contract based on a common-terms-to-all agree-
ment. In The Evening News Association,43 for example, each of two
Detroit newspapers bargained with separate units of the same Team-
41 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
42 In those unusual cases in which, because of the absence of common control of
daily operations or labor relations, the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4) apply to a strike by
employees in one bargaining unit in support of employees in another bargaining unit of
the same employer (see Penello v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 291 F.
Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1968); Kennedy v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild,
F. Supp. , 69 L.R.R.M. 2301 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1968)), application of the principles
discussed above would appear to dictate a contrary result; i.e., the impermissibility of a
refusal to contract in one unit in order to support contract demands of employees in
another unit. In addition, since a strike against one employer, or group of employers in a
multi-employer bargaining unit, in support of employees of another employer, or multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit, would violate § 8(b)(4), a refusal to contract with the former
in support of the latter would violate § 8(b)(3). See Danielson v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, F. Supp. , 70 L.R.R.M. 2487 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1969).
43 166 N.L.RB. No. 6, 1967 CCH NLRB 21,592 (June 29, 1967), petition for review
denied sub nom. Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 872, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968).
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sters local. The Board held that the newspapers did not violate the Act
when they identified certain common issues as vital to each and agreed
that if the Teamsters struck either employer over its refusal to accede
to union demands on those issues, the other would lock out its Team-
ster employees. The newspapers subsequently effectuated the agree-
ment, and the Board held that the Act had not been violated.44 The
two newspapers, the only daily papers in Detroit, were in direct com-
petition with each other and were faced with identical demands from
the same union. Under these circumstances, if the employers had not
been free to combine, the union would have been able to strike one
and utilize the competitive pressure resulting from the other's con-
tinued operation to obtain its demands. Armed with a successful con-
tract from one employer, the union would then have been able to use
that contract, coupled with the threat of a strike, to obtain a similar
contract from the other newspaper. In other words, absent the em-
ployers' power to combine, the union would have been free to utilize
whipsaw tactics against the two employers. If a group of unions deal-
ing with a single employer are not able to combine, that employer
will be similarly free to use whipsaw tactics against them; indeed, the
unions bargaining with GE claimed that it was using precisely those
tactics against them. Hence, the conclusion seems warranted that a
group of unions dealing with a single employer, as well as a group of
employers dealing with a single union, should be free to determine
their common goals and utilize their combined economic power in
support of those goals.45
It might, however, be argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB 46 forbids a union from refusing to sign a con-
tract otherwise acceptable to it until other unions have received a sat-
isfactory contract. In that case, the Court held, inter alia, that an em-
44 See also Weyerhauser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1967 CCH NLRB 21,587 (June 29,
1967), petition for review denied sub nom. Western States Regional Council v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Compare these cases with David Friedland Painting Co., 158
N.L.R.B. 571 (1966), enforced, 377 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1967).
45 Although this discussion has concerned a union's refusal to contract in order to
put pressure on the common employer to agree to the common demands of another unit,
the freedom to refuse to contract should not be limited to the situation in which the
demands in each unit are the same. The protections of § 7 are not limited to those cases
in which the demands of the striking employees are the same as those of the employees
they support, nor do the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4) apply solely because the employees
whom the union would induce to strike are not in immediate common cause with those
whom they are supporting. See cases cited notes 39 &. 40 supra. There is no reason why the
permissible scope of union economic action should be narrower under § 8(b)(3) than it is
under §§ 7 and 8(b)(4).
46 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
[Vol. 54:897
COORDINATED BARGAINING
ployer that had reached agreement on all matters in dispute between
it and the union representing its employees violated its duty to bar-
gain in good faith when it refused to sign a contract embodying the
terms of that agreement.47 Arguably, a union that has reached agree-
ment on all matters in dispute between it and the employer similarly
violates its duty to bargain in good faith when it refuses to sign a con-
tract unless the employer agrees to certain demands made by another
union in another bargaining unit. The two situations are clearly dis-
tinguishable, however. In the former, the refusal to sign takes place
in the context of total agreement between the parties. The employer's
refusal to sign a contract under these circumstances is inconsistent
with the principles of collective bargaining in that it denies "joint
participation in the culminating act of promulgating the wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment." 48 Additionally, when
complete agreement has been reached, the employer's refusal to contract
provides powerful evidence of bad faith; i.e., a desire to deny full recog-
nition to, and so discredit, the employee representative, or to avoid
the agreement at some future date.49 In the case with which we are
concerned, however, the union's refusal to contract is based on an un-
satisfied demand-that the employer offer the same contract terms to
employees in another unit-and is aimed at compelling adherence to
that demand. A union's refusal to contract until all its demands are met
is neither inconsistent with the principles of collective bargaining nor
evidence of bad faith on the union's part. Hence, a union's refusal to
sign a contract based on an inter-union common-terms-to-all agree-
ment is not rendered unlawful by H. J. Heinz.
C. The Effect of Pennington
One further issue to be considered before leaving the question of
the legality of inter-inion agreements of either the minimum-terms-or-
consent or the common-terms-to-all variety is the effect on such agree-
ments of the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v.
Pennington.50 The Court's actual holding in Pennington was quite
iiarr6Nq: A union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust law when
it agrees with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on
othr employers, and apparently then only if the purpose of the agree-
47 Id. at 523-26. This holdingwas subsequently incorporated into § 8(d) of the Act,
which requires "the txecution of a written contract incorporating any agreement iteadied
if requestad by either party." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
48 Cox, supra note 15, at 1423.
49 See id. at 1422-23.
50 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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ment is to force the other employers out of business.5 1 This holding
poses no antitrust problems for unions that agree to seek common goals
from a single employer, since the Court held only that union-employer
agreements are cognizable under the antitrust laws, not that inter-
union agreements may violate those laws. Indeed, the classic statement
of the reach of the antitrust laws to the activities of labor unions would
appear to negate the latter possibility. In United States v. Hutcheson5 2
the Court said:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton
Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the
wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness
or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities
are the means. 53
The inter-union agreement, not involving a combination of labor and
non-labor groups, appears to fall within the protection of section 20 of
the Clayton Act and hence to be immune from antitrust prosecution.54
Language in Pennington does, however, cast doubt on the per-
missibility under the Labor Act of inter-union agreements to seek
common goals from a single employer. The Court said:
[T]here is nothing in the [national] labor policy indicating that the
union and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain
about the wages, hours and working conditions of other bar-
gaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire
industry. On the contrary, the duty to bargain unit by unit leads
to a quite different conclusion. The union's obligation to its mem-
bers would seem best served if the union retained the ability to
respond to each bargaining situation as the individual circum-
stances might warrant, without being strait-jacketed by some prior
agreement with the favored employers. 55
If, as the Court suggests, it is contrary to national labor policy for a
union, by agreement with one employer, to limit its freedom to nego-
51 See Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 813-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
983 (1968); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 82
U. COH. L. REv. 659, 714-21 (1965).
52 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
53 Id. at 232 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The Court quoted this language
from Hutcheson in Pennington, itself emphasizing the italicized language. 381 U.S. at 662.
54 An inter-union agreement to seek common goals from a single employer can also
be distinguished from an employer-union agreement to impose certain labor standards
on another employer in that the former does not restrict competition in the product
market, the evil at which the antitrust laws are aimed. See Meltzer, supra note 51, at 719
n.205.
55 381 U.S. at 666.
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tiate with another employer in a different bargaining unit, it is argu-
able that it is likewise contrary to that policy for a union, by agreement
with another union, to limit its negotiating freedom in a different
bargaining unit vis-h-vis a common employer. In both cases the agree-
ment is incompatible with unit-by-unit bargaining, and the union is
deprived of full freedom to respond to a bargaining situation as cir-
cumstances might warrant.
Pennington need not be interpreted so broadly, however. To the
extent that the vice of the employer-union agreement in Pennington
was that it placed the union in a strait jacket in its dealings with other
employers, the inter-union agreement is distinguishable. An agreement
between an employer and a union that the latter will seek from other
employers the same terms and conditions of employment it obtained
from the first employer may be easily enforced; a clause may be in-
cluded in the union's collective bargaining contract with the first
employer stating that on the union's failure to comply with the agree-
ment, the contract will be terminated or modified to substitute for the
existing terms the more favorable terms given another employer. This
clause places the union under such pressure not to grant more favor-
able terms to other employers that to describe the union as strait-
jacketed in its dealings with those employers is accurate. There is no
comparable technique for self-enforcement of an inter-union agreement
to seek common terms from a single employer. Judicial enforcement
is not normally sought,6 and it has been suggested that if sought it
should be denied.57 Even if such agreements are judicially enforceable,
however, the delay and uncertainty involved in obtaining enforcement
places them in a substantially different category from employer-union
agreements.
Regardless of whether inter-union agreements are distinguishable
from union-employer agreements, however, the Court's opinion in
Pennington should be reconsidered; neither agreement is contrary to
the national labor policy.58 Pennington purports to draw from the na-
tional labor policy a rule that will best serve the interests of union mem-
bers, while at the same time ignoring the utility of the agreements that
it condemns in furthering those interests. For example, a union-em-
ployer agreement whereby the union agrees to seek the same wages and
benefits accorded by the contracting employer from all other em-
ployers in the industry may induce each of the employers to agree to
50 See note 34 supra & accompanying text.
57 See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
58 See generally Meltzer, supra note 51, at 714-21.
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higher wages thAn he would otherwise, because it rem6ves the feat that
a competitor will get a better bargain. Similarly, an inter-union agree-
ment to seek common goals from a common employer may prevent
the employer from whipsawing the separate unions and so improve the
bargain struck by each with the employer. Each of these agreements
may have deleterious results for some union members, but it is one
of the functions of a union'to reconcile the competing interests of its
members in order to present a united front to the employers with
which it deals. As long as the union acts in good faith it is sound policy
not to upset the balance it strikes.5
D. Inter-Union Agreements as a Defense to an Employer's
Refusal to Bargain
Assuming that an inter-union agreement of either of the types
here discussed would be contrary to national labor policy and that a
refusal to contract predicated on such an agreement would violate
section 8(b)(3), would proof of the existence of either agreement
serve as a defense to an employer's refusal to bargain with a union
that was a party thereto? The Board appears to have held, without
analysis, that it would not.60
This holding seems correct. The primary argument against the
Board's decision is that if the inter-union agreement is unlawful, one
method of deterring its use is to privilege the employer to refuse to
bargain with all unions party to that agreement. Privileging a refusal
to bargain, however, might delay all bargaining with unions suspected
of having entered into such agreements, and it is unnecessary to take
this risk. First, the unlawful agreement is harmless if it is not honored,61
and there is no certainty that it will be honored until the union re-
fuses to sign an otherwise satisfactory contract. Second, adequate sanc-
tions are available if the union does refuse to sign because of the agree-
ment. The employer can refuse to bargain further,6 2 and the Board,
59 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 275 U.S. 335 (1964);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
60 See Standard Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), in which the Board held that the
unions involved violated § 8(b)(3) by refusing to sign a contract uhtil the employdr had
met the demands of another union in another bargaining 'unit and also held, without
discussing the relation between the two issuesi that the employeis refusal to meet with
the representatives of the cooperating unions violated § 8(a)(5).
6i See McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 57 F. Sdpp. 690, 707 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cit. 1966).
62 The employer's defenses to a § 8(a)(5) charge at this point would be two-fold: First,
that the union's unlawful agreement was direftly bsafudting negotiations by preventing
the union from signing the agreed-upon toit'ract (see Tines Publishing Co., 79 N.L.R.B.
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upon the filing of section 8(b)(3) charges, can obtain an order direct-
ing the union to sign a contract containing the agreed-upon terms.6 3
III
UNION INSISTENCE ON JOINT BARGAINING
A. Legality
The other question left unanswered by the Board in GE is what
would be the consequences of an insistence by two or more unions,
certified to represent employees of the same employer in separate bar-
gaining units, that the employer meet and discuss with them jointly
their common contract demands. Initially, the Labor Act does not bar
an employer and a coalition of the labor organizations representing his
employees in separate units from negotiating jointly if they wish to
do so; 04 some companies and unions have by mutual agreement used
this bargaining format for a number of years. 5 Nor is there anything
on the face of the Act forbidding union insistence on joint bargaining
when the employer does not agree. Section 8(b)(3) compels a union
to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representa-
tive of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a). Sec-
tion 9(a), in turn, states that representatives chosen by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining "shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect of rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 66 Thus, al-
though section 9(a) provides the chosen union with representative
status only as to those employees in the bargaining unit, it does not
explicitly bar the chosen union from insisting that the employer nego-
676, 683 (1947)); second, that the union's refusal to sign had created a bargaining im-
passe. See, e.g., Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 1967 CCH NLRB 21,170
(March 20, 1967), petition for review denied sub norn. American Fed'n of Television 9, Radio
Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63 See Danielson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, F. Supp. , 70
L.R.R.M. 2487 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1969); cf. Brotherhood of Painters Local 1385, 143
N.L.R.B. 678, 682 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 334 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.
1964); Automobile Wkrs. Union, 134 N.L.R.B. 1337, 1339 (1961); Local 65, Sheet Metal
Wkrs., 120 N.L.R.B. 1678, 1679-80 (1958).
64 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 705 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966); Engle, Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare-and a
Delusion, 19 LAB. L.J. 518 (1968).
65 Engle, supra note 64, at 518; Hildebrand, supra note 38, at 524-25.
66 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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tiate common demands jointly with that union and another union
representing employees in another unit.
One might argue that a demand as to the format of negotiations is
unrelated to "conditions of employment" in the bargaining unit, and
thus outside the scope of subjects on which a party may insist. 7 The
statutory phrase "conditions of employment," however, has not been
limited to the tangible circumstances under which employment takes
place, but has been construed to include all matters that will substan-
tially affect those circumstances. 68 Employers and unions rightly be-
lieve that whether bargaining takes place on a joint or multi-unit basis
may affect the circumstances under which the employees involved will
ultimately be working. Hence, union insistence on joint bargaining
does not appear impermissible on the ground that it is unrelated to
terms and conditions of employment.
An issue more substantial than whether union insistence on joint
bargaining is contrary to the letter of the Labor Act is whether such
insistence is contrary to any policy of the Act.69 The argument that it
contravenes policies of the Act is this: When the Board has found a
particular unit to be appropriate for collective bargaining and cer-
tified a particular union as the representative of employees in that
unit, for the certified union to insist on bargaining jointly with an-
other union certified in another unit is to compel the employer to
bargain in a unit not appropriate for collective bargaining.
The Board has held that "a union which insists upon bargaining
only for an inappropriate unit does not fulfill its obligation to bargain
as defined in the Act." 70 Analysis of the cases in which the Board has
so held, however, reveals that almost without exception they involved
the efforts of a union certified to represent one group of employees to
67 See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
08 See United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 914 (1962). See also Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); UAW
v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967); Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 443 (1965). A limitation
on the scope of the bargaining obligation may be imposed in favor of "managerial deci-
sions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra at 223
(Stewart, J., concurring). But see Ozark Trailers, Inc., supra. But such a limitation would
be wholly irrelevant to the problem here under consideration; whether bargaining shall
take place on a single-unit or multi-unit basis hardly lies at "the core of entrepreneurial
control."
69 See International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs., 119 N.L.R.B. 1792, 1796 (1958), enforced,
266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1959); National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 981-82 (1948),
enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
70 International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs., 119 N.L.R.B. 1792, 1796 (1958) (footnote
omitted).
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press demands on a common employer that would affect other em-
ployees not represented by that union and who had not acquiesced in
the demands. 71 In such cases the affected employees' interest in free
choice of their bargaining representative may well justify the Board's
rule. Interest in free choice does not, however, provide a basis for pre-
cluding insistence by the chosen representatives of both groups that
their employer discuss common demands jointly.72
The combination of units that presses for joint bargaining might
not be "appropriate for collective bargaining" as that term is used in
section 9 of the Act because, for example, the units do not share a com-
munity of interests such that they should be represented by a single
union.73 But the question here is not whether the employees in the
separate units should be represented by a single union; rather, it is
whether two unions certified to represent those employees in separate
units may determine what their common interests are, formulate mu-
tually satisfactory demands, and insist that the employer discuss those
demands jointly. Simply because a combined unit is inappropriate for
representation purposes, it does not follow that a demand for joint
bargaining is similarly inappropriate.7 4
B. Limitation
The suggestion that joint bargaining is not impermissible solely
because combined units would be inappropriate for representation
purposes does not, however, mean that joint bargaining is always per-
missible. Joint bargaining should be limited to those subjects as to
which the unions involved have common demands. For example, a de-
mand that all employees be free to retire at 55 and that an employer-
wide pension fund be set up would be a permissible subject for joint
bargaining, as would a demand that all employees receive an immediate
ten percent wage increase. Suppose, however, that union A wanted a
71 See id.; Local 164, Painters, 126 N.L.R.B. 997, 1002-03 (1960), enforced, 293 F.2d
133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Local 19, Longshoremen, 125 N.L.R.B.
61, 65-69 (1959), enforced in relevant part, 286 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
820 (1961). See also NLRB v. Retail Clerks' Int'l Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1953). But cf.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1957), remanded on other grounds,
277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
72 See Anker, Pattern Bargaining, Antitrust Laws and the National Labor Relations
Act, 19th NYU ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 81, 92-95 (1967).
73 See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1964) and cases cited therein.
74 See Anker, supra note 72, at 101-02. A demand for joint bargaining following
separate unit certification thus in no sense "denies the Board ... ultimate control of the
bargaining unit." Douds v. ILA, 241 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1957). Rather, such a demand
raises the wholly separate question of whether joint negotiations are appropriate even
though a combined unit might not be.
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twenty percent wage increase spread over three years, eight percent the
first year and six percent the following two years; union B wanted a
fifteen percent wage increase spread over two years, ten percent the first
year, five percent the following year; and union C wanted a three-year
contract with a six percent raise the first year and provision for annual
reopening as to wages. Joint bargaining as to wages under these cir-
cumstances would simply be productive of confusion, and the unions
should not be free to insist on it.
As a practical matter, this limitation will not weigh heavily on
unions wishing to engage in joint bargaining. In most cases, union de-
mands for joint bargaining are an effort to obtain uniform terms on
those matters as to which the unions involved have common interests.75
Nonetheless, in the interest of preventing needless disruption of collec-
tive bargaining, the Board would appear warranted in limiting joint
bargaining to those situations in which the unions' demands are the
same.
76
C. Union Insistence on Joint Bargaining as a Defense to an
Employer's Refusal to Bargain
If the unions' insistence on joint bargaining is limited to common
demands, the employer must discuss with each of the unions involved
its demand that he bargain jointly. That demand is related to terms and
conditions of employment in the bargaining unit; hence section 8(a)
(5) of the Act places the employer under a duty to discuss it. On the
other hand, the employer's duty to discuss an issue does not oblige him
to acquiesce in the union's demand;77 to the contrary, he is entirely
free, in turn, to insist on bargaining separately with each of the separate
unions.78
75 See Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining: A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. LJ. 512, 514
(1968); Hildebrand, supra note 38, at 525-30.
76 Nor should the result be different if the positions of the parties are reversed; that
is, if two or more employers are dealing with a single union in separate bargaining units,
those employers should be free to insist on joint bargaining without violating § 8(a)(5) as
long as their contract demands are the same. But see The Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B.
1494 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1967).
77 LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
78 But see Anker, supra note 72, at 102, suggesting that an employer's refusal to
acquiesce in a demand for joint negotiations when such a demand is reasonable would vio-
late the employer's § 8(d) duty "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) (emphasis added). This appears an unlikely use of the italicized
language, the purpose of which surely was to do no more than prevent an employer from
unduly delaying collective bargaining. See, e.g., Cummer-Graham Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1044,
1068-70 (1959), enforcement denied on other grounds, 279 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1960).
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As a practical matter, this conclusion is not likely to lead to a
foundering of the entire collective bargaining process on the prelim-
inary issue of joint or separate negotiations. Assuming that GE was
correctly decided, the common employer, in his negotiations with each
of the unions certified to represent his employees, must permit the
attendance of representatives of all unions, albeit as temporary repre-
sentatives of one. It is difficult to see why the employer would object to
discussing with each of those representatives the common demands of
the several unions. The only reason he might object would be the fear
that to consent to joint bargaining would leave the unions free to
insist on a contract in all units as the price of a contract in any unit.
This fear is unfounded, however; two unions certified to represent
employees of the same employer may insist on satisfactory contracts
in all units as a precondition to a contract in any unit regardless of
whether joint bargaining takes place or could be insisted upon.9 And,
as long as the employer's consent to joint bargaining does not legalize
otherwise impermissible union insistence on satisfactory contracts in
all units as the price of a contract in any unit, there would appear no
reason for the employer to object to joint bargaining and no serious
threat to industrial peace in his possessing the power to object.
The employer should be free under section 8(a)(5) to resist
demands for joint bargaining even if this freedom does lead to in-
dustrial conflict. The essence of the dispute over joint bargaining is
that unions are seeking to increase their economic muscle vis-h-vis the
common employer and the employer is determined to resist. The efforts
of employers and unions to improve their respective bargaining posi-
tions are not to be condemned by the Board on the ground that these
efforts may be productive of industrial strife. To the contrary, as this
article has sought to emphasize, the struggle to obtain, and the use of,
economic muscle as a means to more satisfactory agreements is an
accepted part of the natiohal labor policy.
79 See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
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